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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
BROOKS V. STATE: EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR
INCONSISTENT ORAL STATEMENT MUST BE VERBATIM
UNLESS PREVIOUSLY ADOPTED OR RATIFIED BY THE
DECLARANT; A WITNESS’ STATEMENT SUGGESTING
EVIDENCE CORROBORATED A COMPLAINANT’S STORY
MAY BE HARMLESS ERROR IF NOT INTENDED TO IMPLY
TRUTHFULNESS; SEPARATE CHARGES MUST BE MERGED
FOR SENTENCING IF NOT UNAMBIGUOUSLY BASED ON
DIFFERENT ACTS.
By: Stephanie Lurz
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a witness may not be
impeached with evidence of a prior inconsistent oral statement unless the
evidence is substantially verbatim or has previously been adopted or ratified
by the witness as an accurate summary of their prior oral statement. Brooks v.
State, 439 Md. 698, 98 A.3d 236 (2014). The court also held that a statement
of a witness suggesting that a physical examination of the complainant was
consistent with the complainant’s story does not necessarily imply that the
complainant’s story was truthful. Id. at 702, 98 A.3d at 238. Finally, if the
facts are unclear as to whether a jury’s verdicts on separate charges are based
on different acts, the convictions must be merged for the purposes of
sentencing. Id.
One evening, Laura B. awakened to find Wendall Monroe Brooks, a
handyman who worked for Laura B. in the past, standing beside her bed. He
demanded that she have sex with him. When she refused, he beat and choked
her. Laura B. stated she would comply with his demands if she could take a
break. She went downstairs and he followed her around the house. After a
few minutes, they returned to the bedroom where he raped her. This continued
until she was eventually able to call the police, who dispatched officers to the
scene. The first officer to arrive, Deputy Faby, spoke to Laura B. and took
notes, which he later used to write a police report. In his report, Deputy Faby
stated that Laura B. indicated she invited Brooks into her home. She was
transported to the hospital, where a forensic nurse examined her.
During the trial, the defense moved to admit Deputy Faby’s police report
into evidence to impeach Laura B. on her testimony that she awoke to find
Brooks in her home, uninvited. The trial court denied the motion. The defense
also objected to the statement of the forensic nurse that Laura B.’s injuries
“would verify” her testimony. The trial court overruled the defense’s
objection. Id.
After a five-day trial in the Circuit Court for Harford County, Brooks was
convicted of first-degree rape, false imprisonment, and other related crimes.
He was sentenced to life imprisonment with all but fifty years suspended for
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first-degree rape. Brooks was also sentenced to a consecutive forty-year
sentence for false imprisonment, with all but twenty years suspended. Brooks
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed.
Brooks filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted.
The court began its analysis by determining whether the trial court should
have admitted Deputy Faby’s police report into evidence. Brooks, 439 Md. at
709, 98 A.3d at 242. Maryland Rule 5-616 permits both testimonial and
written extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent oral statement for
impeachment purposes. Id. 439 Md. at 715-16, 98 A.3d at 245-46. Rule 5613 provides that such evidence may be admitted if the declarant: (1) is made
aware of the statement’s content and circumstances under which it was made;
(2) is given the opportunity to admit or deny the statement; (3) has not admitted
to making the statement; and (4) the statement concerns a non-collateral
matter. Id. at 717, 38 A.3d at 246-47. The court acknowledged that these
requirements were met in this case. Id. However, under common law, written
extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement must be a verbatim version
or otherwise signed or adopted by the declarant. Id. at 719-720, 98 A.3d at
247-248. As the defense did not establish Deputy Faby’s report to be a
substantially verbatim version of Laura B.’s statement or that she adopted it,
the court held that the police report was properly excluded. Id. at 727, 98. The
court noted that if the defense had, in the alternative, elected to use Deputy
Faby’s testimony in lieu of his report, it would have been admissible under
Rule 5-613(b). Id. at 718, 98 A.3d at 247.3d at 253.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland then considered the question of whether
the trial court properly admitted the nurse’s statement. Brooks, 439 Md. at
727, 98 A.3d at 253. Previously, the court held that “a witness, expert or
otherwise, may not give an opinion on whether he believes a witness is telling
the truth.” Id. at 730, 98 A.3d at 254 (quoting Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266,
278, 539 A.2d 657, 663 (1988)). In its analysis, the court recognized that the
prosecutor’s question of whether Laura B.’s statements were consistent with
her injuries was appropriate. However, the nurse’s response that the injuries
“would verify” what Laura B. told her could suggest an evaluation of Laura
B.’s truthfulness. Id. at 734, 98 A.3d at 256. The court reasoned that the
nurse’s use of the word “would” before “verify” implied that her statement
was intended to suggest the injuries were consistent with her knowledge of
what happened, not that Laura B.’s story was truthful. Id. at 734, 98 A.3d at
256-57. The court also noted that even if the trial court erred by not striking
the nurse’s response, it would be harmless error, given the weight of the other
evidence. Id. at 736, 98 A.3d at 258.
The court concluded its analysis by addressing whether the trial court
should have merged the false imprisonment conviction with the first-degree
rape conviction for sentencing purposes. Brooks, 439 Md. at 736-7, 98 A.3d
at 258. The court noted the paramount purpose of merging convictions is to
protect the defendant from double jeopardy in accordance with the Fifth
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Amendment and Maryland common law. Id. at 737, 98 A.3d at 258 (citing
Nicolas v. State, 426 Md. 385, 400, 44 A.3d 396 (2012)). The protections
require the merger of sentences if two conditions are met: (1) the convictions
are based on the same act or acts; and (2) according to the required evidence
rule, the offenses are essentially the same or one offense is a lesser-included
offense of the other. Id. at 737, 98 A.3d at 258 (citing State v. Lancaster, 332
Md. 385, 391, 631 A.2d 453 (1993)).
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland previously held that false
imprisonment merges into a rape conviction, as the three elements of false
imprisonment are also elements of first-degree rape. Brooks, 439 Md. at 73738, 98 A.3d at 258-59 (citing Hawkins v. State, 34 Md. App. 82, 92, 366 A.2d
421 (1976)). However, the court also noted “confinement after or before the
rape is committed would preclude the merger.” Id. (quoting Hawkins, 34 Md.
App. at 92, 366 A.2d at 421). In this case, the basis for the jury’s decision was
not apparent. Id. at 739, 98 A.3d at 260.
Laura B. testified that Brooks threatened and attacked her before he raped
her and followed her throughout the house, refusing to let her leave, after he
raped her. Brooks, 439 Md. at 739, 98 A.3d at 259-60. This could support the
notion that the false imprisonment charges stem from acts that occurred before
or after the rape. Id. However, the prosecutor insinuated during closing
arguments that the false imprisonment began when Brooks first appeared in
Laura B’s bedroom. Id. at 741, 98 A.3d at 261. The court stated it must
resolve such ambiguities of fact in the defendant’s favor, and held that the false
imprisonment conviction should have been merged with the first-degree rape
conviction. Id. at 741, 98 A.3d at 262.
In Brooks v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed two
decisions of the lower courts. First, it affirmed the decision to disallow nonverbatim extrinsic evidence to be used as evidence of an un-adopted prior
inconsistent statement. The court also allowed the statement of a witness
suggesting that a physical exam verified the story of the complaining witness,
holding that the statement did not necessarily imply the truthfulness of the
complainant’s story. However, the court reversed the decision of the lower
court not to merge separate charges because the record did not show that the
jury based its verdict on separate acts of the defendant.
Attorneys should note that prior inconsistent oral statements made to police
officers will likely be allowed into evidence through the officer’s testimony
but not allowed to be admitted into evidence through police reports. Attorneys
should also encourage expert witnesses to restate their answers if their initial
response to a question during the trial could be perceived as pertaining to the
truthfulness of the complaining witness, especially if the other evidence is
insufficient to render the statement as a harmless error. Finally, prosecutors
seeking separate sentences for rape and false imprisonment must be careful to
establish the separate acts constituting those crimes

